

PRISM

Peace, Justice, Human Rights

The Troubling New Face of America

by President Jimmy Carter

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Fundamental changes are taking place in the historical policies of the United States with regard to human rights, our role in the community of nations and the Middle East peace process — largely without definitive debates (except, at times, within the administration). Some new approaches have understandably evolved from quick and well-advised reactions by President Bush to the tragedy of Sept. 11, but others seem to be developing from a core group of conservatives who are trying to realize long-pent-up ambitions under the cover of the proclaimed war against terrorism.

Formerly admired almost universally as the preeminent champion of human rights, our country has become the foremost target of respected international organizations concerned about these basic principles of democratic life. We have ignored or condoned abuses in nations that support our anti-terrorism effort, while detaining American citizens as "enemy combatants," incarcerating them secretly and indefinitely without their being charged with any crime or having the right to legal counsel. This policy has been condemned by the federal courts, but the Justice Department seems adamant, and the issue is still in doubt. Several hundred captured Taliban soldiers remain imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay under the same circumstances, with the defense secretary declaring that they would not be released even if they were someday tried and found to be innocent. These actions are similar to those of abusive regimes that historically have been condemned by American presidents. While the president has reserved judgment, the American

people are inundated almost daily with claims from the vice president and other top officials that we face a devastating threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and with pledges to remove Saddam Hussein from office, with or without support from any allies. As has been emphasized vigorously by foreign allies and by responsible leaders of former administrations and

incumbent officeholders, there is no current danger to the United States from Baghdad. In the face of intense monitoring and overwhelming American military superiority, any belligerent move by Hussein against a neighbor, even the smallest nuclear test (necessary before weapons construction), a tangible threat to use a weapon of mass destruction, or sharing this technology with terrorist organizations would be suicidal. But it is quite possible that such weapons would be used against Israel or our forces in response to an American attack.

We cannot ignore the development of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, but a unilateral war with Iraq is not the answer. There is an urgent need for U.N. action to force unrestricted inspections to Iraq.

But perhaps deliberately so, this has become less likely as we alienate our necessary allies. Apparently

disagreeing with the president and secretary of state, in fact, the vice president has now discounted this goal as a desirable option.

We have thrown down counterproductive gauntlets to the rest of the world, disavowing U.S. commitments to laboriously negotiated international accords. Preemptory rejections of nuclear arms agreements, the biological weapons convention, environmental protection, anti-terror proposals, and punishment of war criminals have sometimes been combined with economic threats against those who might disagree with us.



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Contents

- 1 • The Troubling New Face of America
by President Jimmy Carter
- 3 • Wanted: Fellow Conspiritors
by Pauline M. Kazin
- 6 • Poems on War
by Joe Carlson and Rick Jones
- 8 • The Origins of the National Security State in the 1920s
by Mark K. Jensen
- 18 • Recent Humanities Publications

These unilateral acts and assertions increasingly isolate the United States from the very nations needed to join in combating terrorism.

Tragically, our government is abandoning any sponsorship of substantive negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. Our apparent policy is to support almost every Israeli action in the occupied territories and to condemn and isolate the Palestinians as blanket targets of our war on terrorism, while Israeli settlements expand and Palestinian enclaves shrink.

There still seems to be a struggle within the administration over defining a comprehensible Middle East policy. The president's clear commitments to honor key U.N. resolutions and to support the establishment of a Palestinian state

have been substantially negated by statements of the defense secretary that in his lifetime "there will be some sort of an entity that will be established" and his reference to the "so-called occupation." This indicates a radical departure from policies of every administration since 1967, always based on the withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories and a genuine peace between Israelis and their neighbors.

Belligerent and divisive voices now seem to be dominant in Washington, but they do not yet reflect final decisions of the president, Congress or the courts. It is crucial that the historical and well-founded American commitments prevail: to peace, justice, human rights, the environment and international cooperation.

From the Dean:

It is my great pleasure to welcome you to another issue of PRISM. Of course this publication of the Division of Humanities shows only the tip of the proverbial iceberg. What you cannot see or hear in these pages are the many conversations among the Humanities faculty about our scholarly and moral commitments in a troubled world as well as our joy when justice and peace prevail. What we cannot glimpse in these pages are the hours spent in retreats, classroom and hallway discussions, public lectures, adult education forums, writing, and study tours that educate our students and professors about the pleasures and plights of many people with whom we share the earth.

Yet a careful reading of the articles, poetry, and faculty publications in this issue of PRISM will reveal the enduring commitments of scholars in the humanities to that project at the heart of liberal learning: the humanization of life on this earth. Surrounding this collection of prose and poetry are the service learning projects, courses, and capstone seminars through which our faculty invite students to wrestle with the difficult questions and events that mark a global population. Through wise and careful teaching, the hopes and struggles of the globe enter the classroom and the hallway. We are, indeed, fortunate to have a faculty who offer their scholarly expertise to each other and to students who search for meaning in a world marked by suffering and hope.

Barbara Temple-Tharion
Professor of English and Dean of the Division of Humanities

Wanted: Fellow Conspirators

by Pauline M. Kaurin

The daily headlines reflect the relentless march to war and violence: probable war in Iraq, continuing strife in the Middle East and the 'war' on terror. Like other members of faith communities across the globe, I find myself wondering how I, how we, should respond to the violence in our midst.¹ These reflections have led me to wonder how other faith communities responded to violence and what lessons might be drawn for us, here at PLU.

The example that came to mind was Le Chambon-sur-Lignon, a small village in south central France, which during the days of World War II sheltered approximately 5,000 Jews and other refugees from the Nazis in what one of these sheltered children, film maker Pierre Sauvage, called "a conspiracy of Goodness."² During a time when many people found their consciences challenged to respond to the violence in their midst, one community led by two pacifist Huguenot pastors responded to violence with love, to hate with hospitality, to arrogance with humility and to human need with concrete action. Here I explore the lessons of Le Chambon and argue that, despite real differences between our times and communities, they have much to teach us in our own struggles against hate, violence and arrogance. I will likely raise more questions than can be answered here, but I pose these questions as a starting point for dialogue.

Le Chambon was above all defined as a community of believers. While faith communities usually share religious or spiritual traditions and beliefs, these common ties do not necessarily have to be religious in nature. Rather what binds faith communities are common attitudes, traditions, rituals, histories and understandings of the world. Here I want to avoid legitimate concerns that faith communities necessarily require all members to share the same perspective on all issues, to act/speak with one voice or act in the same way for the same reasons. The ties that bind faith communities can do so in different ways and with varying degrees of strength and consent.

What kind of faith community was Le Chambon? At first glance it might seem that Le Chambon was a homogeneous community of Huguenot Christians who lived largely isolated from the outside world, but on closer inspection

the situation is more complex. The village was mainly French Huguenot and much of the leadership came from the pastors, André Trocme and Edouard Theis, both of whom shared this Huguenot Protestantism, as well as a strong pacifist, non-violent attitude rooted in Christianity. However, there were a number of conservative Christians who according to a literal reading of the Bible did not recognize the authority of the clergy. In addition, there were Roman Catholics, those that were wary of religious dogma of any kind and, of course, the Jews being sheltered.

One community led by two pacifist Huguenot pastors responded to violence with love, to hate with hospitality, to arrogance with humility and to human need with concrete action.

The diversity of this faith community can be seen poignantly in Pastor Trocme's own family. André's non-violence and Christianity were strongly intertwined and his life experiences had led him to understand that all human life, friend or foe, is precious.³ These attitudes were not necessarily supported by

the Protestant clergy in France, or even in the village itself when the Trocme's arrived in 1934; Trocme and Theis were a minority of two who objected to fighting the Germans and later to collaborating with them. While André's wife shared some of his views, she had different reasons. She had a healthy skepticism of theology, and responded to people as concrete bodies in need of care. The people who came to her door needed food, shelter, and care, and Magda provided it or saw that it was provided by others.⁴ Like Magda, the pastor's cousin, Daniel, who came to run one of the many schools in Le Chambon, had a strong aversion to religious dogma and was deeply suspicious of all narrow religious belief. However, he saw in the work at Le Chambon a chance to contribute to the betterment of humanity. All of these people shared common attitudes, commitments and acted upon them, but it was not necessary that the same ideas, understood in the same way, led them to these actions and commitments.

Le Chambon was a faith community founded not so much based upon an explicitly

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented to one of the Peace Studies Seminars in Fall 2002 and I heartily thank all the participants for their insights and ideas. Beth Knapp, Jane Crowell, Alison Folsom-Hill, Charles Hump, Ryan Nacey, Kate Kempe and Vivian Hsu.

2. *Weapons of the Spirit*, Pierre Sauvage, First Run Features, 1990. Videocassettes.

3. Phillip Heflin, *Love Inevitably Shed Its Seed*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 450.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

continued on page 4

shared theological doctrine, but on a shared sense of identity, on common perspectives that allowed them to work in concert without having to coordinate and agree on a plan of action in advance. Out of necessity Pastor Trocme knew about many of the actions since he was both the spiritual head of the village and the one who acted as informal coordinator, but it would be easy to over state the influence of the leaders in the village. This was a struggle carried out in the kitchens of the farmhouses in and around Le Chambon, involving most of the village (men, women and children alike) but individuals made decisions and acted largely on their own and according to their own consciences.⁵

Why did it succeed? They had a sense of identity which was derived largely from their collective memory of events that had shaped their community. The Huguenot history of oppression and resistance as a religious minority was kept alive through hymns and other folklore which appeared on a regular basis in sermons, the church newspaper and through folk songs and stories which came to have meaning both as a remembrance of the past and instruction for the present.⁶ Even those that were not Huguenot, who did not explicitly share in this history, identified with elements of this history - whether it be the experience of minority status, experiences of persecution or a biblical heritage - and affirmed their part in the identity of Le Chambon. The villagers, Huguenot and otherwise, saw their current situation in terms of what had happened before; they called on this common memory and its resources to respond to their situation. This largely unspoken "conspiracy of Goodness" happened because they each acted as they saw fit, according to their own consciences, but in the context of a shared faith community and common history.

What are the insights that can be gleaned from Le Chambon? First, they responded where they were, in their own backyard, responding to the needs they saw when they saw them. It started gradually with small actions and small resistances which did not seem to have much significance at the time. Small actions rightly timed took on greater significance later and small actions prepared them, got them in the habit of effectively acting and resisting and most importantly, seeing that their actions and resistance could have an

effect. "For them it was like having a new beautifully colored bird pointed out, a bird they had not seen before. But now that they saw it, they knew from their own experience that there was such a bird, and it could come back."⁷

Second, they responded intentionally, with knowledge of what they were doing and cognizant of the possible dangers involved in their actions; they chose the path of disobedience to one authority, not only because it demanded the sacrifice of their own consciences, but also the sacrifice of the dignity and humanity of others. They understood that they might have to sacrifice their own moral purity to act, but they accepted this with open eyes and the oft repeated phrase, "What else could we do?"

Third, they responded authentically out of their history, identity and consciences. All of their history, beliefs, communal support, traditions and rituals prepared them for this work. They were used to having visitors, to being hospitable and as more refugees came, the pastors and the community committed themselves to the idea that refusing help was the same as doing harm; they decide to become a 'city of refuge.' The village had become used to resisting authority that violated their consciences and individuals were used to acting on their own, but in a common cause.

When the time came, they were well prepared and what seems to others to be an extraordinary task was "the normal thing to do."⁸

Most importantly, they acted in a way that upheld the dignity of those they protected, as well as those they strove against. Ande Trocme preached that they were to resist with the 'weapons of the spirit', but we will do so without fear, but also without hate and without hate.⁹ Magda Trocme fed dinner to the Vichy police who came to arrest her husband, with the characteristically Chambonais attitude "What else could I do? They were hungry." They saw the 'enemies' as human beings, even as they recognized the reality of evil. They saw the Jews they sheltered also as beings with dignity;

Ande Trocme preached that they were to resist with the 'weapons of the spirit', but "...we will do so without fear, but also without hate and without hate.

5. D&L, p. 10 ff.

6. D&L, p. 268. Roger Ducasieu functioned as a historian of sorts for the village, publishing folk songs with Marie-Claire drawings which carried on the theme of resistance familiar to the Chambonais from their Huguenot history.

7. D&L, p. 95.

8. 'City of Refuge' derives from an Old Testament idea that one who comes to the gates is to be protected or the path is to be smoothed in respect to the inhabitants of that city. See Deuteronomy 19:12.

9. Weapons of the Spirit (New York: First Run Features, 1996)

they even went so far as to preserve their relation with God, insisting that this tragedy would not be used to target the vulnerable and try to convert them. Further, these Christians went so far as to see that their guests were able to worship, to observe Sabbath and High Holy Days, and that the Orthodox Jews were able to keep kosher.¹⁰

While we might commend the actions of these people, Le Chambon was an isolated village in rural France during WWII when the evil was quite clear, not a part of a multicultural community in a global village. How can these lessons apply to our faith community, which includes a kind of diversity that Le Chambon did not experience, and must engage a world far different from that of rural France in 1941-45? While on the surface our situations might look different, the essentials are the same. For its time and place Le Chambon was quite diverse, and shared many characteristics with PLU as a faith community. There were a fair number of Protestants, but also Catholics, Jews, conservative Christians and some who had doubts and skepticism about religion in general. They were a community with leaders, who had a religious and cultural tradition, but who also faced a changing world with pressing concerns and needs.

What are these lessons? What does Le Chambon teach us?

First, we can respond where we are, addressing the needs and concerns in our own backyard, including (but not restricted to) PLU and Parkland. When André Trocne went to the Quaker relief organization looking to help refugees from the war, he was told to go back to Le Chambon and make it a center, a safe place for children refugees – especially the Jews.¹¹ And because he and others had laid the groundwork, Le Chambon was more than equal to the task – right in their own small corner of the world. While it is important to be global citizens concerned and engaged with the larger world, the training grounds for our ethical action starts in Parkland. How do we respond to the very real needs in our midst? What will we do when someone comes to our door, to my door, in need?

Second, we can respond authentically from our own identity that includes our history, traditions, rituals and common memory. How can we understand what is happening now in terms of what has gone before? What is that common memory, that which connects our past with our present and future? For PLU it might mean understanding the ties that bind: academic freedom, respect for the basic humanity of all persons, care for the earth, being part of a community and called to vocations in the world.¹² While many of these ideas can be seen as arising from the religious and historical tradition of Lutheranism, this does not and cannot mean that we all have to understand these ideas in the same way. Like the non-Huguenot villagers of Le Chambon, some of us at PLU may connect and identify with these ties that bind drawing on our own experiences, histories, traditions and spiritual views. Nevertheless we, as a faith community, do share these commitments even if we act on them differently. Maintaining these ties that bind will also mean being attentive to our common memory and history. This is not restricted to the official institutional histories and memories (although they are clearly important), but should also include the histories and stories of all the members of the community: students, alumni, staff, administration and faculty alike. What story will they tell about PLU and its place in the world? How can the stories of the past help us respond to the present and future?

Third, and most importantly, we must respond in a way that respects the humanity of those we seek to help as well as those we seek to oppose. This is not contingent on how we perceive that others treat us, but on their and our common humanity. When we look at what kind of conspirators the people of Le Chambon were, we see they were committed without being narrow-minded, constricted without being arrogant and resistant to evil without demonizing those they saw as responsible for that evil. What kind of conspirators will we be? What might a "conspiracy of Goodness" look like at PLU?

10. Philip Heflin, *Les Intimes* (Bread for the World, One World, Hunger and Hope, 1979), p. 55.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 1388.

12. Adapted from Dr. Samuel Torwood, "Five Free Gifts for your Journey at PLU," Address given at First Year Orientation, Pacific Lutheran University, September 6, 2001.

Collected Thoughts on War

The Great Wall

by Joe Carlson 周卡森

A river flows,
With my blood.
A dirty red it is,
And it never goes away.

A mountain I cannot move,
With my veins, or with my nerves.

Because I watch the river flow.

A river flows,
My tears fill it up.
But I still cannot wash away
What I've done.

The wind I cannot change,
With my heart or my thoughts.

Because I watch the river flow.

A river flows,
Bodies stop its steady movement,
There are too many to count.
They will never leave my mind.

I cannot change the past,
With my words or deeds.

Because I am the river flow.

長城

河水奔流，
載著我的血。
它是一縷薄紅
永遠飄在河中。

以我的血管和神經，
我無法移動山體。

因為我在注視河水奔流。

河水奔流，
注滿我的淚。
但我仍然不能除去
我做過的事情。

以我的心和思想，
我不能改變風。

因為在注視河水奔流。

河水奔流
屍體載住了它平穩
的奔流。
數不清的屍體
她們將永遠留在我的
心中。

我不能改變過去，
以我的言行。

因為我是流動的河水。

A LITTLE WAR

by Rick Jones

My brother died
in a little
war
but that's no matter

We first
received
a telegram
then a
letter
signed by
The President
& a General
we did not
know

They didn't
send his
dog tag
some one
said it
was lost

It doesn't matter

I saw the
stitches
in his throat

THE DOGS

by Rick Jones

for Jack Cady

They travel in packs through the city now,
not stopping to sniff hydrants or the tires
of cars abandoned rusting on the street.
The sky is dark. There is no telling how
they came one day behind the howling fires.
My dreams still burn with that unholy heat.

It is Sunday or Tuesday, April or
July—old barbed wire sags across the lots
we used to play in when the park was green.
I want soft warmth around me just once more
below a new clean moon. A woman rots
in the gutter; the dogs are cold and lean.

They track a stray car down for its fresh meat;
a soft soot holds my footprints in the street.

WHY

by Rick Jones

This is not my war;
but my daughter comes to me at midnight
asking why the thunder wakes her
and there is no rain...

How do I explain cannon
to a three year old?

LOS DESASTRES DE LA GUERRA¹

by Rick Jones

Francisco José de Goya y Lucientes
said of men at games of war
— PARA ESO HABÉIS NACIDO —
a last body falls retching blood
into a pool of corpses;
yet we do not hear.

It is only death
— NO SE PUEDE SABER POR QUÉ —
not just dark men die
with artifacts of slaughter
at their throats;
— FERO ESTO ES PEOR —
one man is skewered to a tree
naked and armless;
his face shows disbelief.

A young man moves ahead of me.
His hair is long and dark
with only traces of its being brushed;
a full beard hides his face.
I cannot stand closer to him;
something in his posture says
there are moments he must face
alone with the silence of eyes.

He limps gradually
clockwise in the room.
I think his lips move
sometimes when he stops.
I hear him swallow
once in the quiet of books.
— ESTO ES PEOR —
I read when he moves on.

— GRANDE HAZAÑA CON MUERTOS —

on this, another tree,
the severed tendrils of incorporate men
hang beneath one head
gaping from an upper limb.
An extra leg drips
casually tied by straps
to a withered branch;
a pair of arms swing
shoulderless in the wind,
no body
manipulates
the fingers.
The tree has no leaves.



— LAS CAMAS DE LA MUERTE —
the avenues of vanity
are not measured by the mile
stones do not mark the open grave;
there is no progress to a body count,
but counting hands would doubt the number.
— NO SE PUEDE SABER POR QUÉ —
How can we not hear
the tumult of bodies.
— MURIÓ LA VERDAD —

There is an awkwardness of feeling
that makes me keep my distance still;
it is not the silence just of books,
but of the young man's shoulders
and the sounds of steel hooks on wood.

¹ This title ("The Disasters of War") refers to a series of etchings by the Spanish painter Goya (1746-1828) depicting scenes from the Spanish revolt against Napoleon's occupying forces (1807-1814). The subsequent Spanish phrases in the poem refer to various titles in this series, and translate (in order) as follows: "For This You Were Born," "One Cannot Know Why," "But This is Worse," "This is Worse," "Great Deeds With the Dead," "The Beds of Death," and "Truth Has Died."

The Origins of the National Security State in the 1920s

by Mark K. Jensen

I traveled through Europe, Asia, and Africa with my dream, only the Americans didn't give me a visa.
— Nazim Hikmet¹

The dates of the buoyant, optimistic, future-oriented American Republic passed in the aftermath of the First World War through a slough of despondency. Though this period is now mostly forgotten and does not figure in the consciousness of Americans except as a period of prosperity and license known as the Roaring Twenties, it was then that the character of the United States changed, perhaps forever. The historic commitment to human equality and freedom and the hostility to privilege expressed in the founding texts of the American republic, celebrated in the lifted torch of the Statue of Liberty, had been spluttering for at least half a century. At the beginning of the decade of the 1920s it failed. Though these values continue to receive rhetorical support from our leaders, they are no longer at or near the heart of America's role in the world.²

This view of things is increasingly common around the world. It may not be widely shared in the United States, but then it is not a principle of justice not to be judge in one's own cause? We may have difficulty seeing what we have become. Samuel Johnson wrote: "We are easily shocked by crimes which appear at once in their full magnitude, but the gradual growth of our own wickedness, endeared by interest, and palliated by all the artifices of self-deceit, gives us time to form distinctions in our own favour, and reason by degrees submits to absurdity, as the eye is in time accommodated to darkness."³

What happened to cause this reversal of America's world-historical valence? Perhaps it is a reprise of an old, old story, the story of wealth corrupting republican virtue. The rapidly accumulating wealth that came with the industrialization of the North American continent and the development of a market economy on a continental scale together with the propagation of an ideology of the "free" market had led most Americans to come to view capitalism as an essential aspect of the American project of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." So it was that the

Bolshevik Revolution's triumph in Russia in 1917, combined with other factors like racialist anxieties, caused many in the United States establishment to fear for the future. Did the conduct of modern civilization's proud standard-bearers during the course of the four years of World War I not demonstrate some will to self-immolation? Had not the best chance of avoiding a future war been lost when the U.S. Senate refused in 1920 to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and join the League of Nations? In 1922 the British writer Charles Edward Montague expressed feelings that were widespread when he opined: "The freedom of Europe," "The war to end war," "The overthrow of militarism," "The cause of civilization" — most people believe so little now in anything or anyone that they would find it hard to understand the simplicity and intensity of faith with which these phrases were once taken among our troops, or the certitude felt by hundreds of thousands of men who are now dead that if they were killed their movement would be a new Europe not soured or soiled with the hates and greeds of the old."⁴ It was in this period that Americans decided that they were the target, rather than the vanguard, of the world revolution. And it is in this mood of pessimism that the origins of the American national security Cold War state may be divined.

Many cultural indices of this frame of mind could be cited. A good illustration of the mood is the Mount Rushmore National Memorial in South Dakota, usually taken to be an expression of American triumphalism. In fact it was a monument to pessimism and despair. Though Gutzon Borglum, who conceived and executed the project, studied in Paris from 1890 to 1893 and was a student of advanced artists like Rodin, he was a patriotic sculptor committed to American ideals of democracy and citizenship. Following World War I he lost his faith in the ability of the American experiment to survive, and turned the purpose of the gigantic mountain-sculpting from celebration to memorialization. Borglum chose the location of the Mount Rushmore Memorial because the extraordinarily hard granite rock of the Hancey Range of the Black Hills would endure for eons, long after America had perished. And like a

1. Quoted in Stephen Kinzer, "A Turkish Post-World War Struggle and An Israeli Unconquered Chess," *New York Times* (April 20, 2001), National Edition, p. A21.

2. This has been, of course, and will continue to be vigorously denied. Such denials often appear to show outside the borders of the United States to be based on peculiarly American combinations of cynicism and naiveté. On the refusal of American liberals to recognize the changed situation, Christopher Lasch's *The American Liberal and the Russian Revolution* is revealing. Lasch studies the deep split that developed among American liberals in responding to the Russian Revolution. Writing in the early 1960s, Lasch said he had come to regard the "refusal, under the greatest imaginable stress, to give up the opinion on which liberalism rested [is the] central fact of the period." (Christopher Lasch, *The American Liberal and the Russian Revolution* [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962], p. vi) But the significance of this fact is oblique to interpretation. By the end of the 20th century, most American liberals no longer chose to identify themselves as such for fear of being marginalised in policy discussions.

3. Samuel Johnson, *The Randoms*, no. 9 (April 14, 1750) (www.samueljohnson.com/corrupt.html).

4. A recent volume on this event concludes: "Two facts remain incontrovertible. For all their incoherence and intelligence, Wilson's opponents were wrong. For all his flaws and mistakes, Wilson was right. He should have won the League fight. His defeat did break the heart of the world." John Milton Cooper, Jr., *Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 413.

5. Disenchantment, ch. 13, cited in Barlett's Familiar Quotations, 11th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1998), p. 799.

pariah thinking for eternity, he planned to enshrine the records of the United States and the civilization of the West of which it was the expression in an enormous "Hall of Records" buried deep in the bedrock behind the four famous faces. There the evidence of American greatness would be sealed, to be rediscovered in the far future. It was calculated that the Rushmore Memorial would last perhaps half a million years.

"The 360 feet of wall space will be paneled and recessed to a depth of 30 inches. Into these recesses will be built, in illuminated bronze and glass, cabinets into which will be placed the records of the West World accomplishments, the political effect of its philosophy of government, its adventure in science, art, literature, invention, medicine, harmony — typed upon aluminum sheets rolled and protected in tubes.

"These cabinets will be sealed and may be opened only by an act of Congress; they will extend 16 feet upwards. On the wall above them, extending around the entire hall will be a bas-relief showing the adventure of humanity discovering and occupying the West World; it will be bronze, gold plated."⁶

Berglund's project was conceived in 1924. In the following year Robinson Jeffers wrote in his best known poem, "Shine, Perishing Republic":

While this America settles in the mould
of its vulgarity, heavily thickening to empire,
And protest, only a bubble in the molten
mass, peeps and sighs out, and the mass hardens,
I sadly smiling remember that the flower
fades to make fruit, the fruit rots to make
earth.⁷

It was in the same year that T.S. Eliot wrote his most famous lines, in "The Hollow Men":

This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
Not with a bang but a whimper.⁸

And it was in 1925, too, that F. Scott Fitzgerald published *The Great Gatsby*, also impregnated with the pessimistic mood of the times, as its famous final sentence suggests: "So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past."⁹ The character who best expresses this mood is Tom Buchanan,

who is preoccupied with the precarity of civilization:

"Civilization's going to pieces," broke out Tom violently. "I've gotten to be a terrible pessimist about things. Have you read 'The Rise of the Colored Empires' by this man Goddard?"

"Why, no," I answered, rather surprised by his tone.

"Well, it's a fine book, and everybody ought to read it. The idea is if we don't look out the white race will be — will be utterly submerged. It's all scientific stuff; it's been proved."

"Tom's getting very profound," said Daisy, with an expression of unthoughtful sadness. "He reads deep books with long words in them. What was that word we —"

"Well, these books are all scientific," insisted Tom, glancing at her impatiently. "This fellow has worked out the whole thing. It's up to us, who are the dominant race, to watch out or these other races will have control of things."¹⁰

The concern about decline felt by Tom Buchanan was widespread among elites, and was a factor in the end of open immigration from Europe. No longer was the light to be lifted by the golden door. Arnold Toynbee saw in this change the best indication that the United States had changed from a revolutionary to a reactionary force in world history:

"It is, I think, indisputable that the reaction in the United States to Communism in and since the year 1917 has been a symptom of America's reversal of political course. It is a sign, I think, that the American people is not feeling and acting as a champion of an affluent minority's vested interests, in dramatic contrast to America's historic role as the revolutionary leader of the depressed majority of mankind.

"The United States immigration restriction acts of 1921 and 1924 are, I believe, pointers to the same change in the American people's attitude during and immediately after the First World War."¹¹

Toynbee recognized that the racial fears of people like Tom Buchanan played a role, but considered the economic factor to be primary: "The main motive for the enactment of the acts of 1921 and 1924 was, I believe . . . [anticipation of] a menace to the economic interests of the existing inhabitants of the United States."¹²

John Higham has traced the roots of this

6. Berglund's words as recorded by a newspaper reporter, cited in Gilbert C. Fite, *Mount Rushmore* (1982), 1st printing, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971, p. 201.

7. Robinson Jeffers, *Selected Poems* (New York: Vintage, 1965), p. 9.

8. T.S. Eliot, *Selected Poems* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Harcourt Paperbound Library, 1964), p. 80. Eliot's poem was published in 1925. 9. E.E. Scott Fitzgerald, *The Great Gatsby* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), p. 182.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 13. In the following year, 1926, the R.H. Goddard to whom Tom Buchanan refers would coauthor with F.A. Gibbons a popularization of the philosophy of Oswald Spengler, which we shall discuss shortly, entitled *Civilization of Civilizations: An Essay in the Spenglerian Philosophy of History*. See H. Stuart Hughes, *Oswald Spengler: A Critical Estimate*, rev. ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962), p. 96.

11. Arnold J. Toynbee, *America and the World Revolution* (New York & London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 97.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

continued on page 10

the Land: Patterns of American Nationalism, 1880-1924, 2nd ed. (1963) New York: Atheneum, 1985), p. 30.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 54. Speaking of this period, Higham wrote in a later work: "Bothnesses, seeing how prominently the immigrant figured in the new labor movement, concluded that the control of unions depended on controlling immigration." John Higham, *Sent These to My Jews and Other Immigrants in Urban America* (New York: Atheneum, 1975), pp. 36-39.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 121. The famous last lines of Emma Lazarus's 1893 sonnet, "The New Colossus" — "Give the star your hand, your heart! Your head! no matter coming to land from the sea, the world's great nations, the homeless, temperd to itself by its long exile the golden door!" — expressed an attitude that was already on the defensive and that was steadily losing support, as John Higham shows in an essay entitled "The Standardization of the Statue of Liberty." Essentially, it was the termination of mass immigration (in the 1920s) that eventually made possible a general acceptance of the meaning Emma Lazarus and the immigrants attached to the Statue of Liberty." *Sent These to My*, p. 83.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 138.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 279-82.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 282.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 284.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 285.

21. An even stronger bill that would have suspended legal immigration (except for those relatives of resident aliens) passed the House of Representatives in late 1910 by a vote of 289-62, with all but one nay vote coming from the industrial heartland between Chicago and Boston. *Ibid.*, p. 309.

22. Arthur Link & William Cannon, *American Epoch: A History of the U.S. since 1900*, vol. 2: 1913-1945, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 82.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

24. There has not yet been able to discover the first use of this phrase. Today the term is often understood as an ideological polemic, but the earliest use I have found is in two papers delivered in April 1967 by Richard Chalfont and Gary Reichard, respectively, at a symposium on "The Theory and Practice of National Security, 1947-1960." Norman A. Graebner, *The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1947-1960* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 41, 243. The term certainly predates this, however.

reactionary turn in his classic study of American attitudes toward immigration. "Revolution" became something to fear rather than to applaud in America in the 1870s, following the Paris Commune, the formation of the first socialist party in America, labor conflicts in Pennsylvania's coal country, and the violence of the railroad strikes of 1877. "Henceforth [revolution] would mean, for the most part, not the replacement of monarchy by liberal democracy, but rather the uprising of the working classes against capitalism."⁴³ The anarchist bombing in Haymarket Square in Chicago in 1886 in the context of the 1883-1886 depression activated a xenophobia of hysterical proportions.⁴⁴ So did Czolgosz's assassination of President McKinley fifteen years later.⁴⁵ Racist thinking was also invoked.⁴⁶ Shortly after the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, a virulent anti-Semitism envenomed American anti-radicalism. It was at this moment that the fraudulent "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" reached American shores, where they were circulated in influential circles in Washington, D.C. in 1918-1920.⁴⁷ In the pessimistic

postwar climate the confidence of American progressivism was no longer adequate to counter these growing forces. "All of the xenophobias rampant in postwar America benefited from this failure of democratic morale, for it meant that the chief ideological check on the nativist traditions in the Progressive era was now relaxed."⁴⁸ One of the standard-bearers of this anti-radicalism was the capitalist Henry Ford, who wrote in the *Darwin Independent* in 1920: "The world is sick. . . . We shall have to save ourselves before we can hope to save any one else."⁴⁹ Though reputable opinion rejected Ford's theses, his campaign generated much interest and tacit approval, especially in rural areas.⁵⁰ Anti-radicalism, along with the not unassociated phenomena of racism, isolationism, and anti-Semitism, were the major factors in the passage in 1921 of a bill restricting, for the first time, immigration from Europe.⁵¹ (Earlier action had interfered with immigration from China and Japan.)

If it is true that the historical violence of the American republic, as evinced by the growing suspicion with which poor immigrants were regarded, had shifted from revolutionary protest against unjust oppression to reactionary

defense of wealth and power, the American state had yet to dedicate itself to this role internationally. Indeed, despite the rejection of the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations in 1920, American foreign policy continued to pursue the goals of peace and justice. The U.S. withdrew from a few Latin American countries (the Dominican Republic in 1924, Nicaragua in 1931-1933), and President Harding pledged non-intervention toward Caribbean republics. "The U.S. in the 1920s largely abandoned isolation and American leaders sought to strengthen and protect the peace structure of the world."⁵² Most public leaders agitated for membership "in the World Court, cooperation with the League of Nations, treaties outlawing war, and the like."⁵³ It was only under the pressure of the rise of fascism, a new world war, and the nuclear age that the full power of the American state, embodied in the newly created agencies of the national security state⁵⁴ (Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, National Security Agency, etc.), came to be committed to the cause of anti-radicalism around the world. But the mood of 1920s pessimism had a curious connection to this development, too, though the influence of the philosophical historian Oswald Spengler on a key Cold War advisor, Paul Nitze.

In the intellectual realm, one work's contribution to post-World War I pessimism stands out: Spengler's *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, whose first volume was published in German in 1918 and in English translation in 1926. Spengler's powerful work employed an organicist philosophy of history and an intuitionist epistemology as the basis of a claim to see into the souls of the world-historical peoples, including his own, the "Faustian culture" whose malaise he diagnosed and whose end he prophesied. Spengler denied, though, the charge of pessimism, insisting that his own work was a call to action.⁵⁵ Spengler claimed that it was only in the youthful phase of a culture that creative artistic and philosophic creation was possible. Afterwards, cultures congeal into civilizations — an idea that derives from Nietzsche — whose soul is formed. The work that remains to be done is "extensive," not creative: "Of great painting or great music there can no longer be, for Western people, any question. . . . I can only hope that men of the new generation may be moved by this book to

devote themselves to technics instead of lyrics, the sea instead of the paint-brush, and politics instead of epistemology. Better than that they could not do."²⁵ Spengler's work was a spectacular success in Germany. "Nineteen-nineteen was the 'Spengler year.' Everyone seemed to be reading him; everyone was wondering just who he was. 'Never had a thick philosophical work had such a success — and in all reading circles, learned and uneducated, serious and snobbish.' Within eight years after the original publication, total sales had reached a hundred thousand."²⁷

Success may have been slower in the United States, but the work would eventually play an as yet unrecognized role in the gestation of the national security colossus that now besrides the world. The two volumes of *The Decline of the West* were published in English in 1926 and 1928 respectively, and "after a slow start, Spengler's work won an increasing number of converts."²⁸ By 1940, about 25,000 copies had been sold in America.²⁹ According to James Reston, among the readers was the young Paul Nitze, future architect of the national-security state, who in 1926 was an undergraduate at Harvard. Reston, later one of his neighbors in Georgetown, reports that Nitze "studied, almost memorized, Spengler's *Decline of the West*."³⁰ The son of the head of the Department of Romance Languages and Literature at the University of Chicago, Nitze's life followed the pattern Spengler recommended. Nitze steered clear of humanistic ventures, devoting himself first to business, then to investment banking (like Nick Carraway, the narrator of *The Great Gatsby*). The Chicago brokerage firm of Bacon, Whipple and Company sent Nitze to Europe in 1928-1929. In his memoir, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision*, Nitze describes how, upon his return, Clarence Dillon predicted the depression and the passage of power from "men of finance."³¹ Spengler's work regarded Caesarism as the necessary next phase of Western civilization. Spengler had written: "Imperialism is so necessary a product of any Civilization that when a people refuses to assume the rôle of master, it is seized and pushed into it. The Roman Empire was not conquered — the 'orbis terrarum' condensed itself into that form and forced the Romans to give it their name."³² The youthful Nitze must have thought of his

own nation's destiny as he read these words. When, precisely, Nitze came under Spengler's sway is unclear, however.³³ According to his memoir it was in 1931 in New York and not 1926 in Cambridge that Nitze began to read Spengler's *The Decline of the West*, and in 1937 that he finished it, after having achieved financial independence through a sale to Revlon of his interest in a French laboratory producing pharmaceutical products in the U.S. Nitze describes contemplating Spengler's work on a salmon fishing expedition deep in the forests of New Brunswick.

"At that time [i.e. 1931] my reaction was that it had all the faults of the German temperament; it was brilliant, full of profound feeling and thought, but dogmatic, tough,

How could the tendencies toward cultural decay, socialist Caesarism and war, which he saw as being irreversible, be countered and reversed?

tactless. Along the peaceful banks of the Upsalquitch River [in 1937], I pondered the flaws in its logic. How could the tendencies toward cultural decay, socialist Caesarism and war, which he saw as being irreversible, be countered and reversed? I knew of no one who had a lucid and persuasive opinion on those issues.

"I resigned from Dillon, Read and Company, moved my family to Boston, and matriculated as a graduate student in the field of sociology, with philosophy and constitutional and international law as supplementary fields. It was a memorable year. I learned much about sociology, something about philosophy, and a little about law, but I received almost no answers about Spengler, the trends of the future, and what could be done to affect those trends. At the end of the year we returned to New York, the questions more clearly formed in my mind, but still without answers."³⁴

Among the scholars who influenced Nitze during his year of graduate study at Harvard was the sociologist Robert Merton, whose teaching he later summed up as: "Action is influenced by objectives, and will makes a difference."³⁵ A more thorough review of Nitze's ideas about Spengler is needed, but Nitze's conclusion seems to have been this: he concluded that Spengler's analysis was correct in his

25. Indeed, the French critic André Fauconnier warned that Spengler's ideas were "lightning, always simple and clear enough to become some day the credo of a great popular party passionately devoted to imperialism and state socialism." Quoted in H. Stuart Hughes, *Oswald Spengler*, p. 95.

26. Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, vol. 1, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (1926; reprint, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), pp. 40-41.

27. Hughes, *Oswald Spengler*, p. 89. Hughes is citing W. Weinrich as quoted in Mabel Schaefer's *The Street* on Spengler (1922).

28. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

30. Quoted in Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron* (New York: The National Security State, 1945-1974) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 134. It is curious that that Spengler and Nitze might have had eyes on one another on August 2, 1914, the day after Germany declared war on Russia, setting in motion what Nitze calls in his memoir "the limitless tragedy of World War I." Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost*, p. 10. In 1911 Spengler had been living in Munich, where he conceived and wrote *The Decline of the West*. Hughes, *Oswald Spengler*, p. 1. The seven-year-old Paul Nitze, traveling with his father, mother, and sister, arrived in Munich just in time to witness the city's cowardly patriotic enthusiasm for the imminent conflict. It was only with difficulty that the Nitze family was able to book passage and return to the United States. Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost*, pp. 10.

31. Paul B. Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), p. 100.

32. Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, vol. 2, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (1926; reprint, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), p. 422.

33. Like James Reston, Sydney Talbot reports that Nitze "had read the work in college," and that "on a common fishing expedition in Canada in the summer of 1936 [sic], he read it 'with care, word by word, while waiting for a fish to appear.'" *The Master of the Game*: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), p. 27.

34. Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost*, p. 101.

35. Talbot, *The Master of the Game*, p. 28.

diagnosis of social trends, but wrong in the deterministic conclusions he reached (most historians consider the optimism upon which Spengler's work is founded to be logically unsound).³⁶

Nitze was not the only American influenced by Spengler.³⁷ But he was perhaps the most important in terms of his contribution to American policy and government. He went to Washington to serve on the staff of James Forrestal when Forrestal became an administrative assistant to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in June 1940, and moved through a variety of increasingly important responsibilities during World War II, finishing as one of the directors and later as vice chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. After the war Nitze joined the State Department as deputy director of the Office of International Trade Policy. In government he moved easily among leading policy makers, who were often previous acquaintances from Wall Street. Nitze became one of the leading architects of the national security state in the Truman years. Most significantly, he was the principal author of the 58-page secret planning document known as NSC 68, written in February–April 1950 in the aftermath of the decision to build a hydrogen bomb. This document, made public only in 1977, “portrayed the Soviet Union in the most aggressive light possible and called, among other things, for a massive American rearmament. Perhaps more than any other document of the period, NSC-68 can claim to be the bible of American national security policy and the fullest statement to that point of the new ideology that guided American leaders.”³⁸ Though the material costs (estimated by Nitze as about \$40 billion per year) associated with its program were enormous, Nitze thought that “the real problem was ‘not so much in the field of economics as in the field of politics.’” Here again NSC-68 spoke to the issue of national will and the need for sacrifice if the United States was going to assume its new identity as a redeemer nation in a troubled world.³⁹ The debate over the costs of the new program came to an end with the intervention of Chinese forces in the war in Korea on Nov. 25, 1950. “Suddenly the rearmament program suggested in NSC-68 no longer seemed as unreasonable as before. [Secretary of State Dean] Acheson returned to the offensive and this time got

almost everything he wanted.”⁴⁰ In subsequent months and years, “[t]he new ideology . . . dominated the national security discourse. Indeed, national security concerns became the common currency of most policy makers, the arbiter of most values, the key to America’s new identity.”⁴¹

Spengler had written this about ‘Caesarism’:

“By the term ‘Caesarism’ I mean that kind of government which, irrespective of any constitutional formulation that it may have, is in its inward self a return to thorough formlessness. It does not matter that Augustus in Rome, and Hwang-ti in China, Amasis in Egypt and Alp Arslan in Baghdad disguised their position under antique forms. The spirit of these forms was dead, and so all institutions, however carefully maintained, were thenceforth destitute of all meaning and weight.”⁴²

...that our choice is between willing this and willing nothing at all, between cleaving to this destiny or despairing of the future and of life itself;

Paul Nitze’s practice in his decades of public service, and in the values inherent in NSC-68, reflects this attitude. It is true that he had left the Democratic party because of his belief that Roosevelt’s plan to increase the number of

justices on the Supreme Court, announced in February 1937, was unconstitutional. But this was before he undertook his rereading of Spengler in the following summer. Spengler had written:

“He who does not understand that this outcome [i.e. the domination of Western civilization by the likes of Cecil Rhodes] is obligatory and insusceptible of modification, that our choice is between willing this and willing nothing at all, between cleaving to this destiny or despairing of the future and of life itself; he who cannot feel that there is grandeur also in the realizations of powerful intelligences, in the energy and discipline of metal-hard natures, in battles fought with the coldest and most abstract means; he who is obsessed with the idealism of a provincial and would pursue the ways of life of past ages — must forgo all desire to comprehend history, to live through history or to make history.”⁴³

Attachment to constitutional forms like

36. For a review of critics of Spengler, see Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. 3 (London, New York & Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 221, and vol. 12 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 255–56, citing G.D.H. Cole, Laurence Stone, George Catlin, E.H. Tubb, H. Kahn, E. Borkman, and Richard Patten.

37. John Lardas, *The Big Appointments: The Religion Vicars of Rome, Gibraltar, and Suez* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001), which discusses the influence of Spengler on a group of young Americans of an inclination altogether different from Nitze’s, emphasizes the extent to which Americans projected their own ideas and concerns upon Spengler’s text. “On American soil, *Decline often functioned as a crystal ball, mirroring the hopes and desires of those who looked upon it even as it justified and exacerbated their anxiety.”* *Ibid.*, p. 47.

38. Hagan, *A Cross of Iron*, p. 32.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 299–300.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 311.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 313.

42. Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, vol. 2, p. 431.

43. Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, vol. 1, p. 38.

the balance of powers between the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches of government is a sign, from a Spenglerian point of view, of an ignorant and benighted provincial idealism. In his memoir, Nitze attributes his changed attitude to the war: "[M]y basic thinking and interests, as a result of my various wartime experiences, had changed."⁴⁴ But it is revealing that his prewar entry into government service was already marked by indifference to the niceties of legal forms:

"Forrestal went down to Washington almost immediately. I found myself a few weeks later in Louisiana working out some financing for the United Gas Company (now Pennzoil). One evening when I returned to my hotel in Shreveport, I found waiting for me a telegram which read: "Be in Washington Monday morning. Forrestal." The order seemed clear enough, as far as it went, but it hardly explained much. The next day I found Jim's office in the Old State-War-Navy Building, now the Old Executive Office Building, next to the White House. The only staff the law authorized him to have was one secretary. He told me that he wanted me to occupy a desk in his office, live at the house had rented in Washington, and help him as best he could. The government could not pay me, so I was to remain on the payroll of Dillon, Read. In this wholly illegal fashion my career in Washington began."⁴⁵

After Nitze's mention of Roosevelt's court-packing plan, there are scarcely any further references to the U.S. Constitution in Nitze's 500-page memoir of service to the United States, and none whatever in his discussion of NSC-68. Nitze may be wary of expressing his rejection of American constitutionalism openly, but is the outline of such a view not visible beneath the vague but steely profession with which his memoir begins?

"It is my view that belief is the underlying and basic element of policy and action. First one must sort out matters of belief: who one is, in what relationship to whom, and what general direction in the realm of values is up and what direction is down. Then clear and rigorous logic, based upon a cold and unemotional assessment of the objective evidence concerning the relevant facts, and a careful analysis of the probable outcomes and probable material and moral costs of alternative courses

of action, can help one to get from where one is to where one wants, and should want, to be.

"How have I come to that view? From my grandfather, my parents, and my sister I absorbed a deep interest in ideas. Early in life, as a witness to the limitless tragedy of World War I, I felt grow in me a determination to act, to work with others to influence the course of history and not supinely to accept what, in the absence of will and action, might be the world's fate."⁴⁶

Here as elsewhere we observe Nitze evading a clear statement of just what his beliefs are. But it is clear that they include neither a philosophical attachment to democracy nor a Jeffersonian recognition of the occasional necessity of popular revolution. The nature of the game had changed, according to Nitze, and those who thought otherwise risked destruction. Nitze has not much pity or time for them. Consider, for example, the case of his mentor, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, who had come to be perceived as an obstacle to increased defense spending. A recent historian writes:

Ground down by the bickering and backstabbing in the Pentagon and under constant attack from the admirals and generals he supposedly commanded, Forrestal had also come under severe criticism in the press, especially from radio and newspaper commentators. Walter Winchell and Drew Pearson, in particular, led a campaign of vilification against the secretary, calling him a liar and a coward, accusing him of mismanaging the Pentagon, and attacking his alleged anti-Semitism and his supposedly pro-Nazi bias during the war. Under the circumstances, Forrestal had become increasingly nervous and paranoid. He began to scratch the top of his head raw and to see plots everywhere, usually Communist and Zionist conspiracies. He also found it more difficult to make decisions on his own, which is one of the reasons that Truman finally dismissed him.

After leaving office, Forrestal suffered a complete breakdown. He spent several weeks under psychiatric care at Bethesda Naval Hospital, where his paranoid delusions grew worse. He kept his blinds closed to guard against spies and had Sidney Souers, the executive secretary of the NSC, search his room for listening devices. In the early morning of 22 May 1949, Forrestal, despondent and sleepless, read Sophocles's classic poem "The Chorus from *Ajax*," in which the hero contemplates suicide.

44 Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost*, p. 46.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

He copied several lines of the poem onto a notepad and then walked quietly from his room to a small pantry across the hall. There he tied one end of his bathrobe sash to a radiator, the other around his neck, and slipped silently out the pantry window. He apparently hung helplessly for a few terrifying seconds, scratching desperately at the brick wall of the building until the sash gave way and he plunged thirteen stories to his death. Forrestal had once described himself as a "victim of the Washington scene." After his death, others were more specific, counting the secretary as a casualty of the Cold War and the national security state he had helped to build.⁴⁷

But this is what Paul Nitze has to say about James Forrestal's tragic suicide in his memoir:

"During the Palais Rose Conference word reached me of Jim Forrestal's death. Either he accidentally fell or intentionally jumped from the top floor of the Bethesda Naval Hospital, where he was being treated for acute depression. I was deeply saddened, for Jim had been my partner and mentor for many years. Throughout his life Jim had viewed everything he did as a challenge. Dillon, Read had been a challenge and he had risen to the top. The Navy had been a challenge, and he has reshaped it to help win a war. Then, after Congress passed the National Security Act that unified the armed services in 1947, he became secretary of defense, the greatest challenge of his career. He thought he could do whatever he set out to do. He had a host of friends and associates who had generally helped him once he had had a chance to explain what he was trying to do and why. The straw that broke him to the point of suicide was that he finally found that he could not persuade Mr. Truman of his point of view and that some whom he had considered to be his friends were working against him. It became more than he could bear."⁴⁸

In personal terms, Nitze concludes that Forrestal was simply not tough enough. He "broke." As for the politics of the situation, military insubordination and the problem of civilian control of the military are conspicuously absent from his account. A few pages later in his memoir Nitze reports, again without noting any impropriety, how "just

before the new law [the National Security Act] took effect, Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, then deputy chief of staff for operations of the Army Air Forces, came to me to inquire — all very unofficially and off the record — whether I would be interested in serving as first secretary of the air force when the National Security Act separated the AAF from the Army."⁴⁹ None of these things would surprise Paul Nitze, for although NSC-68 described its purpose rhetorically as the defense of "freedom under a government of laws," "democracies," and, quoting the Preamble to the Constitution, the attempt to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,"⁵⁰ the pattern of Nitze's life demonstrates that he, like others of his generation, had lost faith in all these things. Spengler had summarized his expectations for the contemporary period in a table at the end of the first volume of *The Decline of the West: "1800-2000. XIXth Century. From Napoleon to the World-War. 'System of Great Powers,' standing armies, constitutions. XXth-Century transition from constitutional to infernal sway of individuals. Annihilation wars. Imperialism."⁵¹ Paul Nitze's career had followed this*

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes.	from serving wartime presidents to planning aerial bombing cam- paigns to supervising the development of nuclear weapons to plotting strategies of global domination, that military leaders them- selves could think of no one more fit to become
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the first Secretary of the Air Force, despite his lack of any military service. Nitze would go on to become a veritable fixture of the national security state, serving both Democratic and Republican administrations as a policy planner for the State Department and the National Security Council, Secretary of the Navy (1963-1967), Deputy Secretary of Defense (1967-1969), member of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (1969-1973), Assistant Secretary of Defense for international affairs (1973-1976), chief negotiator of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces treaty (1981-1984), and special adviser to the President and Secretary of State on

47. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, pp. 185-86.

48. Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost*, pp. 72-78.

49. *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

50. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, p. 288.

51. Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, vol. 1, Table III, following p. 428. In a 1963 German edition of the book published by C.B. Beck the table appears at the beginning of the volume.

Arms Control (1984). Strobe Talbott entitled his 1988 book about him *The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace*, whose title alludes to the Spenglerian game described in Hermann Hesse's *Magister Ludi* (*The Glass Bead Game*).

Another master of the game was more attached to the American constitutional system than Nitze: Dwight David Eisenhower. Perhaps this was a factor in Nitze's unfavorable evaluation of Eisenhower in his memoir, where the tough-minded author of NSC-68 marvels at the tender-minded Eisenhower's "uncanny ability to be able to believe in two mutually contradictory and inconsistent propositions at the same time."⁵² The 33rd president of the United States expressed his ambivalence about the effects on America of her embrace of anti-radical geopolitics in a "message of leave-taking and farewell" delivered in a televised address to the nation on January 17, 1961. Though Eisenhower ordered the CIA to overthrow popular governments in several countries, failed to defend civil liberties at home in the face of McCarthyism, and availed himself liberally of the doctrine of executive privilege, he was from the beginning of his administration aware of the danger of sacrificing the democratic nature of the system in order to save it. His successes in defending the Constitution he had sworn to uphold were significant, and included strengthening civilian control of the military, reorganizing the Defense Department, creating a rational system to gather scientific advice, moderating rearmament, and phasing out governmental economic controls.⁵³ In his farewell message, though, he clearly expressed the fear that he had not done enough. His words about the dangers of the military-industrial complex have been quoted thousands of times:

"This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, even spiritual — is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

"In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted

influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

"We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals so that security and liberty may prosper together."⁵⁴

Less well known than this passage is the fact that in the penultimate draft of this address Eisenhower referred to "the military-industrial-congressional complex," striking the last term as an act of constitutional tact.⁵⁵

Those who cite Eisenhower's warning usually do so to support their own pious admonitions to the citizenry. There comes a point, however, when one can ask whether it is not too late. Defense spending declined only moderately after the end of the Cold War, and has recently begun to rise again. It is difficult to estimate the degree of dependence of the American economy on military and defense spending, but it is clearly enormous, and Congressional representatives resist defense cuts that affect their districts tooth and nail. Consider as an example Washington State, where an economist with the state's Employment Security Department estimates that in Western Washington 166,000 jobs, or about 15% of the workforce, depend directly or indirectly on military installations alone, not counting the defense industries.⁵⁶ In Washington State overall in fiscal year 2001, about \$7.06 billion arrived in U.S. Department of Defense payroll, pensions, and procurement contracts.⁵⁷ It would take a volume to deal adequately with the involvement of the military in the area.⁵⁸

Sustaining political support for the national security state over several generations has been a challenge for the military-industrial-congressional complex. The American loss sustained in Vietnam and the revival of respect for constitutional principles during the Watergate crisis represented the low ebb in its fortunes, and Jimmy Carter began his presidency in 1977 by evoking what historian Michael Sherry calls a "determination to break from America's militarized past."⁵⁹ The successful restoration of the military industrial complex's

52. Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost*, p. 296.

53. Hagan, A Cross of Iron, p. 405. Hagan also describes how Eisenhower's desire to move toward ending the Cold War was frustrated by his national security advisers, however.

54. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Farewell Address," in *The Annals of America*, vol. 18 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1966), p. 3.

55. Lars Erik Nelson, "Military-Industrial Man," *New York Review of Books*, vol. 47, no. 20 (December 21, 2000), p. 6. See also William D. Hartung, "Eisenhower's Warning: The Military-Industrial Complex Forty Years Later," *World Policy Journal*, vol. 18, no. 1 (Spring 2001).

56. Seattle Times (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/nation-world/local/military/Wa_military.html), accessed March 27, 2002.

57. Michael Gilson, "Military Spending Grows in State," *Tacoma News Tribune* (April 24, 2002), pp. B1, B2. Washington State was seventh among the fifty states in this regard. See also <http://www.comms.gov/press/wa/wa01.html>.

58. No such volume has yet been written, but a model for such a book can be found in a recent work by an anthropologist, Catherine Lutz, *Hemlock: A Military City and the American 10th Century* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001) examines the effects of war and the military on life in Fayetteville, North Carolina. On Western Washington, see University of Washington historian Michael Sherry's "The Cold War and Real State in Washington State," an online curriculum project for Washington schools with links to about fifty primary source documents. Have notes "The Cold War created many aspects of modern Washington," (www.washington-military.com/wa01.html), accessed March 27, 2002.

59. Michael S. Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 342. But Sherry notes a few pages later that "Even as his idealistic start as President, [Carter] never proposed cuts in the defense budget, thus leaving the engine of militarization running at full speed even as he tried to control its products." *Ibid.*, p. 346.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 397.

81. Robert N. Bellah, *The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial*, 2nd ed. (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Bellah's volume was first published in 1975, and derives from an earlier essay entitled "Civil Religion in America," published in the *Winter 1967* number of *Daedalus*.

82. Professor Hecks is cited in Adam Clymer, "Rethinking Reagan: Was He a Man of Ideas after All? A Gathering of Scholars Looks at His Place in History," *New York Times*, national edition (April 6, 2002), p. A17.

83. *Ibid.*84. *Ibid.*

85. Winberg's "A Model of Christian Character," with its striking image of Americans as "like a City on a Hill, the eyes of all people are on us," has resonated throughout American history. A modern restatement is reprinted in *The Annals of America*, vol. 1 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1966), pp. 129-33. In *The Life of the Mind in America* (1965), Perry Miller wrote that "in relation to the principle theme of the American mind, the necessity laid upon its first founders, Winberg stands at the beginning of our consciousness." Cited in Bellah, *The Broken Covenant*, p. 13.

86. Quoted in Clymer, "Rethinking Reagan," p. A28.

87. Sherry, *In the Shadow of War*, p. 503.

88. George W. Bush, "Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation," September 11, 2001 (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911.html, accessed March 27, 2002).

89. Eisenhower, "Farewell Address," p. 2.

90. Cheney can be said to incorporate all aspects of the modern American military-industrial-congressional complex, having served as Congressman from Wyoming (1976-1980), Secretary of Defense (1989-1993) — though he has never served in the armed forces), and Chairman and CEO of Halliburton Co., a Dallas company specializing in oilfield work and industrial and marine engineering (1993-2000), with prior experience in the executive branch, becoming White House chief of staff for President Gerald Ford when his mentor Donald Rumsfeld left that post to become Secretary of Defense in 1975. For insights into the operation of this

dominance was achieved only by the strategic alliance of the Cold War establishment with the religious right which constituted the so-called "Reagan revolution."⁹⁰ With this development, the national security state at last found a stable ideological and political foundation through a connection to one of American history's most enduring features, the civil religion so ably analyzed by sociologist Robert Bellah.⁹¹ Hugh Heclo, a political scientist at George Mason University, has recently analyzed Reagan's historical significance in similar terms. According to Heclo, "the core Reagan idea was a 'sacramental vision' of America; God's unique relation to America was the central chord from which all else followed."⁹² As early as 1952 Reagan had said "I believe that God in shedding his grace on this country has always in this divine scheme of things kept an eye on our land and guided it as a promised land."⁹³ As President, Reagan often linked the defense establishment to this historical role: thus "[i]n his first Oval Office speech, [Reagan] spoke of the aircraft Midway as a metaphor for America as the redeemer nation, 'rescuing a tiny boat of refugees adrift in an open sea.'⁹⁴ The importance of this doctrine is that it disarmed the strident unmaking of America's reactionary turn, cloaking the nation and its national security state in the mantle of the Protestant covenant theology memorably articulated by John Winthrop in 1630.⁹⁵

Since the 1980s this doctrine has become a shibboleth of the Republican Party. It seems fair to say that the fact that, as Heclo says, it is "dangerously close to idolatry" is that "the oversight of the nation, intrinsically innocent, is assigned an ultimacy that seems indistinguishable from worship"⁹⁶ has, in fact, contributed to its appeal. The importance of this development can scarcely be overstated, for it elevates the national security state to a sacred status and makes criticism of it seem to smack of blasphemy.

Still, why a peace-loving people should require such an enormous military establishment even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union posed a conundrum for the masters of the national security state in the 1990s. So much was this the case that Michael Sherry's study of the American militarization of the twentieth century concluded that this period of U.S. history was probably ending. Prognosticating in the early years of the first Clinton Administration, he wrote:

"Facing no stark economic crisis, no large-scale disaster in war, and no sudden demise of its interests and politics that long had sustained militarization, the United States likely would continue to drift only fitfully and partially away from its militarized past, as actual and projected defense budgets for the 1990s indicated. The strategic, ideological, and economic foundations of militarization — never as solid anyway as its champions had maintained — had ended to the point of disappearing."⁹⁷

He immediately added, however: "but its historical momentum persisted," and this persistence has provided the solution to the conundrum in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. The decision to interpret the criminal atrocities of an undetermined number of conspirators not acting in the name of any state as an act of war came within a matter of hours or days. In his remarks to the nation on the evening of September 11, President George W. Bush said: "America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world."⁹⁸ It follows from this interpretation — which ignores the fact that it was the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that were attacked, not the Statue of Liberty, Congress, or even the White House — that the need for the national security state is a consequence of the collision of our unique virtues with some principle of evil in the world, rather than any special danger. We may expect the military-industrial complex to be enshrined as a permanent feature of American life if this doctrine prevails, since the source of our problems is presented as a condition that is permanent rather than what President Eisenhower presented in 1961 as a condition of temporary, albeit "indefinite," duration.⁹⁹

On February 15, 2002, Vice President Richard R. Cheney¹⁰⁰ explained that the war on terrorism will serve as the functional equivalent of the Cold War in maintaining support for the military-industrial complex:

"Throughout the time that I've been a member of the [Council on Foreign Relations], most of our debates were defined by the cold war. When America's great enemy suddenly disappeared, many wondered what new direction our foreign policy would take. We spoke, as always, of long-term problems and regional crises throughout the world, but there was no single immediate, global threat that any roomful of experts could agree upon. All of that changed five months ago. The threat is known and our role is changed now. We face an enemy that is determined to kill Americans by any means, on any scale and on our

soil. We're dealing with a terror network that has cells in 60 countries. Such a group cannot be held back by deterrence nor reasoned with through diplomacy. For this reason, the war against terror will not end in a treaty. . . . This conflict can only end in their complete and utter destruction. . . . America has friends and allies in this cause, but only we can lead it. . . . We are in a unique position because of our unique assets, because of the character of our people, the strength of our ideals, the might of our military and the enormous economy that supports it."⁷⁵

In early October 2001 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld — under whose aegis Dick Cheney first went to Washington in 1969 — made a similar comparison and reached, implicitly, the same conclusion: "The Cold War — it took 50 years, plus or minus. It did not involve major battles. It involved continuous pressure. It involved cooperation by a host of nations. And when it ended, it ended not with a bang, but through internal collapse. It strikes me that might be a more appropriate way to think about what we are up against here than would be any major conflict."⁷⁶ Condoleezza Rice, President Bush's National Security Advisor, has made similar remarks. Having said in a Foreign Affairs article published in 2002 that "The United States has found it exceedingly difficult to define its 'national interest' in the absence of Soviet power," she told a journalist in early 2002: "I think the difficulty has passed in defining a role. I think September 11th was one of those great earthquakes that clarify and sharpen. . . . I really think this period is analogous to 1945 to 1947," referring to the years in which the

containment doctrine took shape.⁷⁷ There is, in fact, reason to believe that the war on terrorism will prove superior to the Cold War as a justification for the apparatus if the national security state, since the danger asserted can be diffuse, invisible, and mysterious. The recent eugenicism of federal government agencies to expand use of the state secrets doctrine — a Cold War innovation first invoked in 1953 that has been used only sparingly — suggests as much.⁷⁸

The acceptance of these views by the broader public suggests that the American people have moved the nation from a somewhat reluctant embrace of anti-radicalism in early years of the twentieth century to an again somewhat reluctant, but nevertheless resolute embrace of an internationally interventionist anti-radicalism at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Although only the religious right embraces with enthusiasm the notion of a global war on evil, polls show that a large majority of Americans support the Cheney-Rumsfeld doctrine. The robust global military role that this entails is now widely perceived to be essential to maintaining American affluence and to be more important than promoting democracy and supporting human rights. Whether pliable Americans have a very clear idea, given the corporate filters on their mass media, of the nature of their relation to the rest of the world, is questionable.⁷⁹ But there can be no doubt that their leaders understand, and reached long ago the conclusion that their own hold on prestige and power depends on pursuing an anti-democratic global hegemony. Any other conclusion flies in the face of too much contrary evidence.

75. "Toward the end of the nineteenth century . . . the press (and later the media) became an important capitalist marketplace. Over time the media system became virtually less competitive in the economic sense. Not only were most media industries concentrated in the hands of a small number of firms, barriers to entry made new competitive challenges almost impossible. Hence the 'bar of entry' to make the free press provision in the First Amendment a near universal right for citizens was effectively eliminated. Along these lines, virtually no new daily newspapers have been successfully launched in existing markets in the United States since World War I, despite their immense profitability and growth. And, likewise, no new major Hollywood film studios have been established in sixty years either. Moreover, the logic of the marketplace has led to the consolidation of media giants so that the largest firms like Time Warner (now AOL Time Warner) and Disney have dominant holdings across many media sectors. . . . This corporate media system has some of the intrinsic interest in politics or journalism that existed in the press of earlier times." Robert W. McChesney, *Rethinking Media, Power, Democracy, Communication, Politics in Deleuzian Times* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999), pp. 270-71.

system, see Kasey Botco & Nicholas Helms, "Cheney Led Halliburton to Feast as Federal Trough: State Department Questioned Deal with Firm Linked to Russian Mob," *The Public* (www.public.com/story_01_0602001.htm, August 2, 2000, accessed March 27, 2002), which details \$1.8 billion in federal contracts and taxpayer-financed loans received by Halliburton during Cheney's tenure there.

71. Richard D. Cheney, speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York Times (February 16, 2002). In an interview broadcast on MSNBC on March 31, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave a "40 or 50" number of countries possessing terrorist cells.

72. <http://www.msnbc.com/news/010905.asp>, accessed March 27, 2002. Note the allusion to Eliot's "The Hollow Men," cited earlier — possibly innocuous, or perhaps Rumsfeld deliberately refrained from the banalizing suggestion that the Soviet Union had ended with "a whimper."

73. Nicholas Lemann, "The Next World Order," *New Yorker* (April 1, 2002), p. 44.

74. The state secrets doctrine was first recognized in *United States v. Reynolds*, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953). In *Halkin v. Helms*, 690 F.2d 977, a federal appeals court ruled that "[i]slands of state — matters the revelation of which reasonably could be seen as a threat to the military or diplomatic interests of the nation — are absolutely privileged from disclosure in the courts. . . . Where the court is satisfied that the information poses a reasonable danger to secrets of state, even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege. . . ." This doctrine has already been invoked twice in 2002 in cases involving the Department of Energy's operation of the Los Alamos Laboratory and the Central Intelligence Agency's compliance with anti-discrimination laws. Steven Aftergood, "State Secrets Privilege Gets a Workout," *Security News*, Volume 2002, No. 34 (April 23, 2002) (<http://www.iss.org/pubs/news/secure/2002/04/042302.html>, accessed April 23, 2002).

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